The impacts of the global financial crisis on the real economy, economic policies and academic debates. by Alfazema, Antonio
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The impacts of the global financial crisis
on the real economy, economic policies
and academic debates.
Alfazema, Antonio
Joaquim Chissano University
20 November 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104160/
MPRA Paper No. 104160, posted 15 Nov 2020 21:47 UTC
 
The impacts of the global financial crisis on the real economy, economic policies 
and academic debates. 
 
 Abstract 
The years preceding the crisis were characterized by strong global growth and relatively stable and 
low inflation in most countries. Growth was driven by significant increases in productivity in many 
countries, which, combined with the further integration of developing countries into the global 
economy and a strong expansion of trade, allowed prices to remain relatively stable for several 
years. The Article presents a summary of the facts that guided the global financial crisis, affecting 
the growth of the economy as a whole. Academics are unanimous in stating that the contours of 
the crisis stem from several combined factors, in the failure to comply with some basic rules, as 
the crisis can be relatively manageable if assets and liabilities are denominated in the country's 
currency. 
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Origins and causes 
Unlike the experience of the 1950s and 1960s, the growth of household consumption was 
"absorbed" by the evolution of income. It depends more and more on the wealth effect, i.e. the 
virtual valuation of financial and real estate assets. Between 2003 and 2007, residential 
construction and strong real estate valuation stimulated and maintained household consumption. 
This growth model, combined with poor supervision, ended up generating excessive debts of 
financial institutions, companies and families, which proved unsustainable. Continuous low 
interest rates led investors to seek higher returns on stocks, real estate and commodities and 
financial instruments that increase risk. Asset prices in a wide range of industrialized countries and 
emerging economies have risen, and many developing countries have benefited from the high cost 
of commodities. In publications such as the "World Economic Outlook and Trade and 
Development Report," the United Nations has expressed concern about rising household, public 
and financial debt in the United States and other parts of the world. 
The global demand for higher income has been accompanied by an increase in financial imbalances 
on an international scale. High savings rates in Asia and oil-exporting countries have financed high 
consumption rates in the United States and other industrialised countries. When global confidence 
in over-indebted financial institutions and complicated asset structures began to dissipate in 2008, 
these imbalances became apparent. In a highly integrated world economy, without proper 
regulation, a breakdown in one part of the system has huge repercussions in others, as we see 
today.  Belluzzo speaks of little more than a decade of world economic growth that has allowed 
the consolidation and expansion of an optimistic consensus: the existence of a new phase of 
development of production, uninterrupted and prolonged, in which the increase in household 
wealth would be able to sustain consumption and the new technologies would meet the increase in 
productivity. The crisis allows us to see beyond these appearances. There is growing conviction 
that this cycle is related to the indebtedness of families and companies, backed by a fictitious 
valuation of financial and real estate assets; great availability of financial capital, in search of high 
earnings and with little aversion to risk; deregulation of the financial system; access to cheap 
products and the existence of extremely high surpluses in the balance of payments of several 
exporting countries, and the financing of the American imbalance at very attractive interest rates. 
Based on a qualitative methodology, based on the historical method, the article has the theoretical 
rescue of the main currents on international financial crisis, and the historical review of the 
formation and functioning of the financial system in periods of crisis, were made through the 
review of literature already existing in books and articles. The analysis shows that the international 
financial crisis requires a combined effort of several institutions, such as the IMF; the World Bank 
and regional development banks; the International Clearing House; the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision; the Financial Stability Forum; the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions on Securities Regulation; the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
and the International Accounting Standards Board. Academics note that better regulated systems 
can go off the rails during outbreaks of euphoria. Just look at the combination of the so-called 
subprime crisis and the collapse of securitized loans in the United States.  
 
 
 
 
International Crisis Characterisation  
The creation and spread of subprime mortgages was largely the result of the process of intensifying 
banking and financial competition during the 1990s. More specifically, this decade was marked 
by the weakening of the boundaries of the areas where banks and non-banking financial institutions 
operate, and also by the relatively low returns from traditional credit markets (loans to firms, 
consumers and governments). One of the results of this period was the articulation between 
financial innovations in mortgage contracts and securitization processes. This articulation, in turn, 
made possible the expansion of the American real estate financing system towards riskier 
operations associated with the subprime group. 
 The term subprime refers to an enormous contingent of borrowers hitherto excluded from the 
credit market. This group included borrowers with no credit history, borrowers with no proof of 
income, yet with good payment histories, and even borrowers with defaulters. As mentioned 
above, mortgages were made possible on the creditors' side by the combination of financial 
innovations and securitization processes. In this context, the transformation of extremely risky 
credit operations into well-valued securities by respected rating agencies resulted in a significant 
increase in credit supply. On the real side of the economy, the demand for new mortgages - which 
could be securitized, packaged and distributed to non-banking financial institutions - stimulated 
the growth of the construction sector which, amid the fragility of other autonomous demand 
components, made it possible to sustain reasonable rates of economic growth. The mechanisms 
for transforming credit operations were so complex that even the most conservative investors 
ended up participating in this "current".  
As a rule, the contract for the sale of mortgages masked the conditions for their repayment, which 
made it easier to attract buyers. Commonly, loans were of the 2/28 or 3/27 type, i.e. in thirty years 
of contract the first two or three years had stable and relatively low instalments and interest rates, 
while in the remaining years both instalments and interest rates were high and readjusted according 
to some indexation criterion. In turn, the continuous growth of property prices allowed for debt to 
roll over after the end of the affordable interest and principal period. To this end, debtors took out 
a new loan on the same conditions as before, but with a higher value. Thus, the rise in real estate 
market prices made it possible to pay off the previous loan and, eventually, to transform the "asset 
value of their homes into purchasing power through credit" (Freitas and Cintra, 2008; p.417). 
 
Financial crisis in the age of globalisation  
 Dynamics of crises. 
Martin Wolf considers that the liberalisation of the repressed introspective financial systems of the 
1950s and 1960s led to excesses and not infrequently to serious crises. Moreover, these crises have 
been externally exacerbated by the iteration of financial systems with central features of macro-
economic policy, in particular exchange rate regimes and monetary and fiscal policies. Most major 
crises and all those that were less manageable by domestic authorities occurred in emerging 
economies and became intractable, mainly because they involved large foreign currency liabilities.  
For Wolf, 2009, P.58-59. The unfolding of the crises was due to the sudden cessation of capital 
flows, which forced current account deficits to fall, currencies to collapse and credit to shrink. A 
deep recession followed. In emerging economies hit by the crisis, devaluations often resulted in 
concentration of the economy rather than a reverse expansion of what occurred in many high-
income countries. One explanation for this difference is the low credibility of monetary policy in 
many emerging economies. The devaluations are seen as predictions of inflation. As a result, 
monetary policy must be tightened rather than loosened. Another more important reason is the 
prevalence of mismatched exchange rate positions in the economy. Currency devaluation directly 
threatens insolvency for any debtor with foreign currency denominated debts whose resources 
were used to finance assets in the domestic market. 
Why is there so much fear of current account deficits today? After all, it is perfectly possible to 
have mismatched currency positions in countries with balanced current accounts, there are several 
reasons: 
More importantly, the current account deficit, at the end of the day, always generates mismatched 
exchange positions in the balance sheet of any country that depends on loans (or the demand for 
direct investments) to cover its external deficit and is unable to borrow in its own currency. Large 
current account deficits seem to be one of the triggers of capital outflows. The correction of large 
deficits requires devaluation of the real exchange rate-perhaps very large-having serious problems 
for the domestic economy if there are mismatched exchange positions in the aggregate balance 
sheet. Awareness of this fact is a good reason for capital outflows that trigger currency 
depreciation. It also tends to reduce the maturity of loans which, as a result, become increasingly 
risky as lenders try to increase the liquidity of their positions. Finally, the rapid correction of 
current account deficits is always painful and should be avoided as much as possible. 
Therefore, the lesson learned by many emerging economists, both those directly affected by crises 
and those who have remained in an observant position, is not to tolerate current account deficits. 
This strategy offers another, perhaps more important, advantage: if the current account position is 
strong and if the pressure on the currency is to appreciate, there is no risk of the IMF intervening 
and imposing politically unacceptable demands. This fear is not exclusive to those who have 
already suffered crises. The Chinese government has certainly observed what happened to its 
neighbours in 1997-1998 and concluded that it would never allow something similar to happen to 
China. 
The Financial Crisis, Social Impacts and the Role of the State  
Belluzzo believes that few analysts have been able to resist the euphoria that has accompanied the 
last two growth cycles of the North American and world economy. The "optimistic consensus" 
prevented a realistic assessment of the forces driving the expansionary cycle. The flawed 
diagnosis, incidentally, led to the prediction that the downturn would be quick and right around 
the corner the recovery will be on the horizon. WOLF.(2009, p.58-59). 
For Belluzo,(2009), Urban and Orbi Credit has shown an impressive and unprecedented post-war 
evolution. In the two episodes of demand stimulation (1994-2000) and (2003-2007), firms and 
households significantly increased spending above current income. The accumulation of debt, 
especially from 1996 onwards, occurred at a rate much higher than the growth of labour wages 
and capital profits. It is the optimistic assessments of future profits and income - still driven by 
spectacular stock market performance and the myth of the new economy - that have led private 
spending to exceed current income. This difference reached 6% of GDP in the last quarter of 2000. 
Today more people are willing to recognize that American growth in the second half of the 1990s 
and the first decade of the third millennium was promoted by high deficits in the private sector, 
supported by credit expansion. In the first cycle, between 1994 and 2000, the remarkable capacity 
for innovation of the American economy materialised in the rapid accumulation of new productive 
capacity, especially in the information technology sector. At the same time, household 
consumption was on the rise and personal savings were breaking negative records. In the last ten 
years - between the 1st quarter of 1998 and the same period in 2008 - the GDP of the United States 
grew by 31%, or 2.7% per year. Household consumption grew by 3.4% per year and increased its 
share of GDP from 67.1% to 71.6%. It is not necessary to be clever to conclude that the 'adjustment' 
took place by reducing household savings from 4.7% to 0.2% of GDP. US household spending 
grew well above disposable income, "leveraged" by the accelerated expansion of indebtedness. 
External savings" (the surplus of Asians and Germany) financed the current account deficit in the 
balance of payments. It was the counterpart to the private sector deficits. Over the past ten years, 
American households - despite modest growth in income and employment - have enjoyed the 
benefits of the productivity gains of Asian workers. On the one hand, the real income gains of 
American consumers have been provided by lower prices from Asian manufacturers; on the other, 
emerging "exporters" have shifted accumulated reserves to finance the current account deficit and 
the fiscal deficit of "consumer" partners. BELLUZO (2009). In the author's view, the expansion 
cycles of the world economy, led by the United States (1996-2000) and (2003-2007), have been 
buoyed by optimistic expectations about the duration and vigour of expansion. 
 Complacency spread among banks, businesses and consumers. Financial deregulation incited 
"animal spirits" who, it must be said, were more eager for enrichment than in past cycles. Such 
circumstances have led to a natural relaxation of risk assessment criteria. The gearing that 
combined high growth and very low interest rates instigated the multiplication of dangerous 
financial innovations, among them, the over-leveraging of positions and the spread of credit 
derivatives. Commercial and investment banks, pension fund managers, mutual funds, private 
equity funds, not to mention sophisticated hedge funds, all consolidated the conviction that they 
were shielded from market, liquidity and payment risks. 
The valuation of assets causes a global financial crisis. Over the last 30 years, deregulation and 
liberalisation of finances have broken down the barriers imposed by the reforms of the 1930s. In 
1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act created the financial holdings. The current financial crisis has 
been embedded from the outset in the structure of finance based on "originate, distribute, leverage 
and protect" methods. Economists have diverged, as always, on the depth and scope of the 
problems created in the mortgage markets and their derivatives. Pessimists bet on the combination 
of adverse factors that can lead to a longer recession due to non-virtuous "adjustments" between 
wealth, income and indebtedness. Otherwise, the high leverage of households combined with the 
reduction in income caused a strong and unexpected growth in their debts, both in relation to 
current monetary flows and in relation to their assets. 
 
Global Financial Crisis: Banks' losses and credit contraction 
Given the integration of the different market segments, the crisis that started in the subprime 
market spread rapidly to the various segments of both the American and global financial markets. 
In a scenario of high uncertainty regarding counterparty risk, banks began to exercise a preference 
for liquidity by borrowing in the interbank market. They also reduced lending to customers, even 
those with excellent risk 
In the view of Freitas and Cintra , (2008, ) banks' losses and credit crunch Given the integration of 
the different market segments, the crisis that began in the subprime market spread rapidly to the 
various segments of both the American and global financial markets. In a scenario of high 
uncertainty regarding counterparty risk, banks began to exercise a preference for liquidity by 
borrowing in the interbank market. They also reduced lending to customers, even those with 
excellent risk. With the deterioration of subprime loans, rating agencies downgraded the rating of 
hundreds of securities related to subprime mortgages, contributing to increased uncertainty about 
structured financial products.  
With the crisis, the rating methods of these agencies began to be questioned by European and 
American authorities. This is mainly because there is a clear conflict of interest involved in risk 
ratings, since almost 50% of the agencies' revenues come from rating these complex structured 
finance instruments underwritten by banks. André Cunha believes that throughout 2008, especially 
in the second half of the year, the global nature of the financial crisis originating in the US was 
made explicit. The breakdown of credit channels occurred amidst the bankruptcy and/or 
restructuring, with strong state intervention, of important financial institutions, mainly in the US 
and Europe. All segments of the financial markets, in virtually all national economies, were 
strongly affected, with substantial falls in the prices of financial assets. The spiral 
Deflationary in financial markets takes the form of what has been called "complex deleveraging", 
in that it involves the disruption of financial positions previously assumed in a context of high 
asset leverage (BIS, 2011; IMF, 2011; Unctad, 2011). In addition to the significant reduction in 
the national value of financial wealth, the crisis has affected the real side, reversing, extremely 
quickly, the previous stable growth environment. Thus called "great moderation" (Bernanke, 2004) 
and the thesis of the "take-off" of emerging markets gave rise to a widespread perception that the 
real dimension of the crisis would reach everyone.  
The first Uzan contraction (Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee, 2008) organised a seminar in 
October 2008, turned into a book, with contributions from the most significant experts on 
international financial issues. The Institute for Internation Finance (the most influential class entity 
in the international financial sector) also published a document with its reform proposals (IIF, 
2009). Critical economists have long improved Keynes' original proposals, adapting them to 
contemporary conditions, as evidenced, for example, by the work of Davidson (2002), Ferrari 
Filho and Paula (2004), Arestis and Paula (2008), and Ocampo and Stiglitz (2008).  
The crisis would be more intense in mature economies, due to the strong prior indebtedness of the 
private sector and, even more so, the impacts of national strategies to respond to the crisis and 
rescue financial systems. These have created a serious fiscal problem and potentially new 
speculative bubbles (Unctad, 2011), apud André Cunha, (2013). 
From the exceptionally favourable environment to the Global Financial Crisis It is important to 
realise at the outset that between 2003 and 2008 (first half), the world economy experienced an 
exceptionally favourable cycle of expansion.  
This "exceptional" character was due to the confluence of some factors, mainly: high growth - with 
average rates of change in global GDP of around 4% - associated with low inflation (at least until 
mid-2007); a resumption of dynamism in regions that, in the 1980s and 1990s, showed low levels 
of income expansion, such as Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe, or in mature economies 
such as Japan and Germany; substantial improvement in the external accounts and public finance 
performance of developing economies previously characterized by high levels of external 
vulnerability and fiscal fragility (BIS, 2007, 2008; ECLAC, 2008; IMF, 2011; Toloui, 2007), apud, 
André Cunha (2013). For Cunha, these characteristics emerged at a time when the structure of the 
economy was revealing a new reality: emerging economies such as China, India, Russia, Brazil, 
among others, began to have a weight on world income, trade flows and the determination of the 
general pace of expansion equivalent to or higher than that of central economies. According to 
IMF estimates (IMF, 2008), in 2007 and 2008 more than half of global GDP, measured in 
purchasing power parity, was generated in developing countries. The central axis of this new 
global order revolved around the US and China (BIS, 2011; Ferguson; Schularick, 2007; Unctad, 
2011). 
In short, Nozaki (2011) argues that national actions are essential not only to prevent crises, but 
also to minimise them. The central state has a large bank (the act of the last central bank acting as 
lender of last resort and market maker) and a large government (a government acting through anti-
cyclical fiscal, credit, sectoral and social policies). However, as far as the United States is 
concerned, the first form of action can be considered the main one, as there is no doubt that the 
state and central banks play a key role in maintaining a structurally unstable economy. If so, it is 
important to note that there are also differences in the intensity of actions by the monetary 
authorities of central countries.  
Although the Federal Reserve's intervention is more sensitive, the European Central Bank's 
performance has been relatively timid. On the one hand, concerns about the limitations of the 
exception policy are reasonable and on the other hand, as the national fiscal deficits of the United 
States and Europe themselves increase and domestic public debt expands, they cannot become 
premature concerns. In view of the above counter-cyclical measures, the debt of the private 
financial system has been replaced to some extent by public sector debt. Unfortunately, during the 
transition from 2009 to 2010, this trigger provided a basis for opposition to discussions on the need 
for reforms and regulations in the international financial system to support the revival of tight and 
rigid monetary and fiscal policy defences. Similarly, state intervention and public spending are 
once again seen as the source of the crisis, when in fact they are rather the consequence of the 
safeguard operations carried out by the state so that the financial market could reactivate its 
functioning, which, it is worth noting, will only happen for a longer period of time if state action 
continues. (Nozaki, 2011). 
 
The 2008 financial crisis - Crisis and recovery of confidence  
The financial crisis in the world is serious. says Luiz Bresser. Nothing is comparable to it since 
1929. It is a deep crisis of confidence resulting from a chain of loans originally based on insolvent 
debtors who, by leading economic agents to prefer liquidity and thus liquidate their claims, are 
leading banks and other financial firms to the downturn even if they themselves are solvent. 
However, given the prompt and generally competent reaction of the governments of all countries, 
which have understood the seriousness of the problem and have little hesitation before taking 
measures to increase solvency and ensure liquidity in the markets, there is no reason for pessimism.  
I am sure that soon reason will return to the markets, the stock markets will recover part of their 
losses, exchange rates will stabilize again, and the recession - inevitable - will have nothing like 
the 1929 crisis, said Bresser (2009), considering that there are a number of facts that are clear today 
about this financial crisis. First, we know that it is a banking crisis at the heart of capitalism, not a 
balance of payments crisis - common among developing countries that were trying until the 1990s 
to grow with external savings, i.e. with current account deficits and external debt. The large current 
account deficits that marked the US economy in this decade, combined with large public deficits, 
are, however, no stranger to the banking crisis. The lack of confidence is not only in banks and the 
market, it is also in the US economy as a whole, seriously weakened by these irresponsible policies. 
On this second point, the author points out that the direct cause of the crisis was the irresponsible 
granting of mortgage loans to creditors who were unable to pay or who would not have it from the 
moment the interest rate began to rise as in fact it did. And we also know that this fact would not 
have been so serious if the financial agents had not resorted to irresponsible "financial innovations" 
to securitize the rotten bonds into AAA bonds by the work and grace not of the Holy Spirit, but of 
risk agencies interested in pleasing their clients. On the third point, Bresser (2009) argues that all 
this can happen because national financial systems have been systematically deregulated since the 
neoliberal or market fundamentalist ideological wave began to form in the mid-1970s. For her, 
markets are always efficient, or at least more efficient than any corrective intervention by the state, 
and can therefore perfectly well be self-regulated.  
For this ideology, which since the Reagan administration has become the instrument of American 
soft power, this was the most efficient economic system - the only way for other countries - since 
the alternatives would be forms of European "social democratic socialism", "populism" in the 
Third World, and "disguised statism" in Russia and China which would be much inferior. In the 
fourth scenario he believes that this ultra-liberal ideology was legitimised in the United States by 
neoclassical economic theory - a school of thought which was dominant between 1870 and 1930, 
which went into crisis and was replaced by Keynesian macroeconomic theory, which became 
dominant in universities until the mid-1970s, and has since returned to the dominant condition for 
essentially ideological reasons. Economists such as Friedman , James Buchanam, Mancur Olson, 
Robert Lucas, Kydland and Prescott pointed out their weapons against the state and took it upon 
themselves to demonstrate mathematically, "scientifically", with the help of the assumptions of 
homo economicus, "rational expectations" and "rational choice" that the neoliberal creed was 
correct. 
For the fifth Bresser stage (2009), he understands that we know that this type of economic theory 
has not been used by policymakers in governments as much as by macroeconomic analysts in 
companies and in specialized newspapers and publications. They were not used because the 
neoclassical assumption of efficient markets dispenses with any economic policy other than fiscal 
adjustment; the rest should be liberalized, deregulated, since markets would be self-regulated. As 
governments and analysts needed to guide their monetary policy, they continued to use Keynesian 
instruments in a pragmatic way. Neoclassical macroeconomic experiments were reserved for 
developing countries. Since, however, the rich countries led by the United States did not escape 
the deregulatory prescription, they acted as the "scorpion that bites its own tail". On the sixth point, 
he concludes that now, when we see the state appearing in each country as the only lifeline, as the 
only possible safe haven, the absurdity of the opposition between market and state proposed by 
neoliberals and neoclassics becomes evident.  
A liberal may oppose coordination of the market with that of the state, but he cannot, as the liberals 
have set themselves, stand against the state, seeking to diminish and weaken it. The state is much 
bigger than the market. It is the constitutional-legal system and the organization that guarantees it; 
it is the instrument par excellence of collective action by the nation. It is the State that regulates 
and guarantees the market and, as we now see, serves as the lender of last resort. All this is very 
clear. What is not clear is why the markets are resisting confidence-building despite the strong 
measures governments are taking around the world. I have no sure answer to this question, but I 
believe that two factors contribute to the depth of distrust: on the one hand, the weakening of 
American hegemony in the 2000s not only because of twin deficits but also because of the Iraq 
war, human rights abuses, and the instrumentation of democracy as a form of domination. 
Impacts of the African Financial Crisis 
In recent years, the economies of African countries have maintained strong growth, especially in 
the process of strengthening their balance sheets. However, the increase in food and fuel prices in 
2007 and 2008, which led to the global financial crisis, has weakened the external position of net 
importers of food and fuel. This leads to an increase in inflation and a reduction in economic 
growth prospects (Fernandes, 2012, p.12). 
For Fernandes (2012), The performance of African countries' financial systems shows that 
domestic resource mobilisation is limited; their productive investment channels (savings 
mobilisation) have been very slow and loans to the private sector are also problematic, especially 
for small lenders. One of the good news is the reduction of inflationary pressures. The food crisis 
has improved; despite the shrinking Asian economies, China continues to provide support; 
compared to a few years ago, the maturity and strength of the sub-Saharan African economy also 
faces such a situation. 
OYA (2012) argues that in the face of the 2008 crisis and the much anticipated global recession of 
2009, which in some OECD economies (read the Eurozone, for example) has deepened to the 
present day, there were different expectations about how Africa would be affected. While many 
felt that the effects were not so devastating because of the low exposure of the region's financial 
systems to 'toxic' assets, others said that the very economic openness of most of the region's 
economies and their dependence on OECD markets changed conditions enough for a painful 
transmission of the recession in the industrialized world and the behaviour of sub-Saharan 
economies (Lawrence 2010). Fosu (2010) makes an empirical distinction between the shock 
through trade ("trade shock") and the financial shock ("financial shock").  
The latter includes not only the exposure of the financial system to the international crisis, but also, 
mainly, the effects on financing flows relevant to African growth processes. In general, therefore, 
three "real" transmission channels were anticipated: (a) a fall in demand for commodities and thus 
in the value of exports (through quantity and prices), one of the key drivers of growth in 2000-07; 
(b) a reduction in emigrant remittances; and (c) stagnation or reduction in foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The 2008 and 2009 data confirm that these were the key transmission mechanisms of the 
international crisis in the initial phase, mainly the effect of international trade, whose impact on 
GDP is greater than FDI or remittances. (Lawrence 2010; IMF 2010) For its part, Arieff, W Weiss 
e Jones (2009), apud Fernandes (2012). 
 
They argue that African economies are the most exposed and vulnerable in the global financial 
system and their banks do not have the strength to help them mitigate the effects of the crisis. They 
also argue that the financial crisis affects African economies in several ways: (i) the contraction of 
global trade, including the reduction of export demands for African commodities, (ii) the broad 
interconnection of financial conditions across the sea, and (iii) the slope of foreign direct 
investment and other capital inflows.   
One might think that this impact of the global crisis on African economies, apparently less 
significant than anticipated, was due to their relative marginalisation from the global capitalist 
economic system, Oya believes that quite the opposite is true, as the economies of the region are 
very integrated into the global capitalist economy; their degree of openness in terms of 
international trade is very high and their exposure to fluctuations in international markets is 
evident, such as changing the impact of the 2007-08 food crisis. Moreover, a relatively 
unfavourable and vulnerable integration of African economies in the international arena partly 
increases their structural weakness in the face of capitalist cycles, although, compared to other 
regional areas, the transmission mechanisms of the crisis alternate due to different characteristics. 
In fact, official data from 2008 and 2009 have shown that Africa is not unrelated to the fluctuations 
of the global economy. (OYA,2012) 
 
The crisis and challenges for the new international financial architecture  
Maryse et al (2009), analyses the consequences of the 2008 crisis, saying that the international 
financial crisis, which originated in mid-2007 in the US subprime mortgage market, has taken on 
such proportions that it turned into a systemic crisis after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers 
investment bank. The unfolding of the crisis put the international financial architecture in jeopardy, 
as it explained the limitations of the basic principles of the banking and financial regulation and 
supervision system currently in place, as well as the survival of a specific profile of financial 
institutions. For Maryse, it is important to outline some of the main factors that transformed a 
classical credit crisis into a financial and banking crisis of immense proportions. In a classical 
credit crisis, the sum of the potential losses (corresponding to loans granted with low collateral) 
and their distribution would already be known, while in the current configuration of financial 
systems, credit derivatives and structured products backed by real estate credit have replicated and 
multiplied such losses by an unknown factor and globally redistributed the risks arising from them 
to a wide variety of financial institutions. 
Uncertainties about the actual state of the balance sheets of these institutions have led to a freeze 
on the interbank markets, expressed in extremely high spreads. Since the massive liquidity 
injections by the monetary authorities, which have relaxed their requirements and accepted 
practically any collateral as collateral, have not been able to reverse this process of "liquidity 
buffering" on a global scale, the countries of the European Union, the United States and other 
developed countries have followed the example of the United Kingdom and have announced, in 
the last two weeks, guarantees for these credits.  
The first factor stems from the basic principle of self-regulation by the market that has guided all 
supervisory and regulatory measures in recent decades. Maryse points out that this principle can 
be expressed as follows: corporate governance and risk management of banks have evolved to 
such an extent that their decisions can be considered the most appropriate and efficient to avoid 
the occurrence of episodes that could lead to systemic risk. It was he who guided, to a large extent, 
the changes to the Basel Accords that incorporated, in their second version (Basel II), the ratings 
agencies' notes and the internal models of asset pricing and risk management as alternative criteria 
for rating credit risks and incentives to use mechanisms to mitigate those risks, including credit 
derivatives.  
The author identifies the second factor associated with the strong interaction between universal 
banks and other institutions, resulting from the financial architecture that is being challenged. 
Banks, which since the 1980s had been looking for various ways to remove credit risks from their 
balance sheets and make them more liquid, began to use financial innovations more intensively in 
order to leverage their operations without having to reserve the capital coefficients required by the 
Basle Accords. But this strategy was only feasible because other agents were willing to assume 
the counterpart of these operations, that is, to take these risks against a return that, at the time, 
seemed high. These agents were the financial institutions that formed the so-called shadow 
banking industry. 
 
Final Considerations 
As final considerations, the essential role of the government is to provide the institutions that 
promote and sustain confidence in financial promises. Governments are responsible for 
promulgating and protecting property rights, although private actors may also travel some distance 
in this direction. Governments are also responsible for creating the most important of all financial 
markets-the public debt. The development of a secure market for government bonds is the 
foundation on which all other debt markets are built. 
Academics suggest a concerted effort by various institutions, such as the IMF; the World Bank 
and regional development banks; the International Clearing House; the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision; the Financial Stability Forum; the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions on Securities Regulation; the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 
and the International Accounting Standards Board. Academics note that better regulated systems 
can go off the rails during outbreaks of euphoria. Just look at the combination of the so-called 
subprime crisis and the collapse of securitized loans in the United States. This experience shows 
that financial crises are inevitable. Uncertainties about the actual state of the balance sheets of 
these institutions have led to a freeze of interbank markets, expressed in extremely high spreads. 
But it also shows that a crisis can be relatively manageable if assets and liabilities are denominated 
in the currency of the affected country. Therefore, the most important lessons of the crisis are the 
inevitability of financial irresponsibility and the importance of funding in national currency. For 
us, these scenarios of unchecked crisis carry with them a number of conjunctural factors that, 
combined with the efforts of supervisory measures and self-regulation of markets, banks and 
governments, and with a clear policy, one can avoid successive financial meltdowns and 
consequently crises. 
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